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"Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory:
A Review of the Recent Contributions"
Abstract
This paper reviews the recent literature on regulation under asymmetric
information. If first develops the conceptual framework and offers a reminder
of the techniques used in the field. It then applies the framework and
techniques to a variety of situations, with or without the use of accounting
data. Next, the analysis is extended to dynamics with or without commitment.
The paper concludes with desirable directions for research.
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1. Introduction.
This survey reviews the literature on government regulation under
asymmetric information.1 This literature typically assumes that the
"regulated firm" knows more about its environment or technological
possibilities than does the regulating body (the two parties are referred to
as the "firm" and the "planner" in this paper). The firm is an "informational
monopoly" in that it earns rents due to its private information (as opposed to
a "natural monopoly" associated with increasing returns to scale). The
purpose of modelling informational asymmetries explicitly is, at a normative
level, to formalize the imperfect control of regulated firms and to derive
optimal incentive schemes. At a positive level, it allows the assessment of
pricing and cost reimbursement rules currently being used. For instance, it
may shed some light on how far from optimal are average cost pricing, or more
generally Boiteaux-Ramsey pricing, and rate-of-return regulation. As usual,
the cost of a more careful description of informational realities is the
adoption of a partial equlibrium framework.
The paper focuses more on "hidden information" than on "hidden actions."
These two situations are commonly recognized as polar cases of principal-agent
models with asymmetric information (see Arrow [1985] and Milgrom [1987]). In
the principal/agent model, the agent (here, the firm) obtains some private and
exogenous information before or after the contract is signed. It then takes
some actions that result, perhaps randomly, in outcomes. The principal (here,
1For reviews of the literatures on non convexities in production and
Ramsey pricing with symmetric information, see respectively Guesnerie
[1984] and Sheshinski [1984].
1
the planner) is able to costlessly observe some of the agent's actions and
some of the outcomes, and makes a transfer to the agent that is a function of
the observable variables. Note that comunication may be part of the agent's
(observable) actions.
The "hidden information" model refers to cases in which the planner can
infer from the observations every action taken by the firm conditional on the
agent's private information (the agent does not face randomness when taking
actions). By contrast, the hidden action or "moral hazard" model refers to
the case in which the agent does not obtain private information before
choosing actions, but some noise prevents the principal from inferring the
agent's actions from the observations. Most of the paper focuses on a special
kind of hidden knowledge, "adverse selection," in which the agent obtains his
private information before signing the contract with the principal, and the
principal designs the contract.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the different
modelling options concerning the objectives of the planner and the behavior of
the firm; Section 3 analyzes the basic static framework and presents the
standard techniques; Section 4 studies some variations on this basic model, in
which the firm is "responsive" to incentives, whereas Section 5 discusses the
cases in which the planner cannot extract any information from the firm;
Section 6 analyzes cost manipulation by the firm; Section 7 analyzes the
dynamics of regulation, pointing out the role of commitment and finally,
Section 8 gathers some concluding remarks and proposes further lines of
research, emphasizing the hierarchical aspects of public and private firms'
control.
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2. Modelling options.
2.1 Planner's objectives.
Most of the studies presented here can be viewed as exploratory.
Ambition to generality is somewhat premature and almost all the models
describe very stylized facts. There is a single firm;2 its production
technology is formalized as the transformation of one (or at most two)
input(s) into one or sometimes several outputs. The analysis is partial
equilibrium in the sense that it isolates the subsector from the economy under
consideration and formalizes in a very crude way the impact of policies on the
rest of the economy.
We will describe the modelling options that have been taken in the
literature through a simple example.
Firm: The firm produces an output, the quantity of which is q; it faces
the cost function C(q), and receives a transfer t from the planner. The
commodity may be a marketed good; the firm then receives both the transfer t
and the market revenue P(q)q, where P(q) is the inverse demand function. Or
it can be a non-marketed good delivered freely to consumers (in which case t
is the firm's only income). The profit is equal to ' = P(q)q+t-C(q) and 7 =
t-C(q) respectively.
q
Consumption: The consumers' gross surplus is S(q) = | P(r)dT, and their
0
net surplus is S(q)-P(q)q-t for a marketed good, and S(q)-t for a non-marketed
2Since this survey was written, two topics related to the competition
among firms have been particularly developed, which, due to lack of
space, we will not discuss: second sourcing (Anton-Yao [1987], Caillaud
[1986], Demski-Sappington-Spiller [1987], Laffont-Tirole [1987a]), and
auctioning (Laffont-Tirole [1987b], McAfee-McMillan [1987] and
Riordan-Sappington [1987)).
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one.
Planner: Standard first-best analysis describes social welfare as the
sum of consumers' net surplus and of producer's surplus (profit). This
formulation can be viewed as the specification of the general equilibrium
surplus discussed in Guesnerie [19843 under a number of restrictive
conditions, including the absence of income effects and the assumption that
the sector is small enough to have no influence on input prices. However,
because of the existence of distributional considerations and because there
are costs associated with monetary transfers from the planner to the firm, the
first-best criterion has been modified in two ways. The first consists in
introducing distributional considerations through a coefficient (1-k)
affecting the firm's profit (or in a more general way the firm's welfare).
The second introduces a cost of public funds: raising and transferring
through public channels $1 is assumed to cost $(l+k') to society (for
instance, taxation in other sectors distorts incentives). The following table
summarizes the various objective functions:3
3Note that, in the case of a non-marketed good the formulations in terms
of ditributional objectives or of cost of public funds are similar,
(identify respectively [iS), ~k in the first case to (S(q),k') in the
second one).
In the cost of public funds case, whether the good is market or not
does not change the planners' objectives. However, the firm's
objectives are different. Note that if we had taken net rather than
gross transfers as a control variable, social objectives would have
looked different while private objectives would have been identical. The
solution thus depends on whether or not the good is marketed, and not
only on total surplus S(q).
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Non-marketed Good
Narketed Good
Distributional Objectives
[S(q)-t3+(1-k) [t-C(q) ]
(S(q)-P(q)q-t]+(l-k) [P(q)q+t-C(q)]
S(q)-C(q)-k't
S(q)-C(q)-k't
The two formulations in general lead to similar qualitative results. For
the techniques developed in Section 3 and for the derivation of most results
surveyed in the paper, the crucial assumptions are that the firm prefers
transfers, the planner does not and both are risk neutral.
More generally, the planner can take a monetary measure of the firm's
welfare into account and not only its profit. This remark makes particular
sense for those firms whose objectives are not limited to profit maximization
but also include slack for instance (this will be a feature of some models
considered later).
The formalizations of the planner's objectives summarized in the previous
table have several shortcomings. Some are obvious but can be eliminated at
the cost of an increase in complexity. For example, in the case of a
multi-agent firm, which will be considered later, the evaluation of social
welfare might discriminate among the different agents. The main objection,
however, concerns the absence of clear general equilibrium justifications.
One can justify the distributional-objectives version in the case of an
economy in which the producer is a wealthy man who produces the good from his
own endowment while the rest of the economy consists of identical poor small
consumers; the cost of public funds is classically justified by the use of
distortionary taxation for raising funds. A more satisfactory justification
should rest on a second-best model, itself based on explicit informational
constraints, at the margin of which we would consider the effects on the
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Cost of Public Funds
optimal solution of the perturbations created by a change in the firm's
production and transfers. The clarification of the above questions is
certainly a priority in the present state of the theory.
In the tradition of welfare economics, the formulation adopted here views
the planner as an exogenously given "arbitrator." Attempts have been made to
study in particular the "political economy" aspects of the planner's
4
intervention, so as to endogenize the social welfare function. In
particular, the so-called "economic theory of bureaucracy" emphasizes that the
legal-political system favors the occurrence of inefficiencies and distortions
of goals in public organizations. An examination of these inefficiencies in
the light of social choice and incentives theories should take into account
the legal and informational aspects of the political process. The approach
taken here is not inconsistent with a positive theory of bureaucracy. An
analysis of the control of bureaucracies, itself based on asymmetric
information, will yield a more satisfactory formalization of the planner's
objectives.
2.2 The firm's behavior.
A key feature of the problem of control of production is how the firm
reacts to incentives. A number of different hypotheses are made in the
literature we are surveying. As we emphasize below, this variety of
behavioral assumptions often reflects the variety of situations that inspire
the contributions, rather than a more fundamental reflection on what
4See Aumann-Kurz [1977], Guesnerie-Oddou [1981] and the literature on
social choice.
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distinguishes the various types of organization.
In the first modelling option, the firm maximizes its profit (e.g.,
Averch-Johnson [1962], Baron-Myerson [1982)). A second common modelling
option has the firm trade off between some variable called effort, and money
(e.g., Holmstrom [1982a], Laffont-Tirole [1986]). Other contributions
introduce even more complex objectives that are arguably less primitive than
effort and money (the managers' utility function may then be a reduced form,
as we discuss below).
The predominantly British literature on the control of nationalized firms
in mixed economies emphasizes the role of workers, generally through unions,
in the decision process of such firms. Some formalizations of the
nationalized firm's behavior trade off between managers' or workers' interests
and social objectives (Rees [1982] and Gravelle [1982)).5 Ward [1958] offered
another objective function for the firm, which was to maximize profits per
worker. He argued that this labor-management hypothesis could explain the
behavior of nationalized industries. The consequences of this extreme
assumption under asymmetric information are studied in Guesnerie-Laffont
5One might wonder whether as a sociological law the emphasis put on labor
power in the explanation of nationalized firms behavior increases with
the size of the nationalized sector in the country of citizenship of the
authors. This does not seem to be the case since in France where the size
of the public sector is comparable to the size of the British one, most
of the theoretical literature at least until recently seemed to accept
the idea that the decisions of the public sector correctly internalized
the government objectives. In fact, the debate on the investment program
in nuclear plants of Electricite de France was probably the first time
when the argument that the public firm behaved in its own interest
against public interest has been consistently and publicly put forward.
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[1984a,b].
The (aforementioned) large body of literature on the economic theory of
bureaucracy mainly focuses on non-market organizations. It generally
expresses a distrust of public organization, and has been popularized by the
Public Choice School associated with the names of Buchanan and Tullock.
According to the views advocated in this literature, inefficiencies in public
organization originate in the behavior of bureaucrats who trade off between
the public interest and their own private interests. The main emphasis has
been put on managers' objectives described in formalized models either as
budget maximizers (Niskanen [1971]) or as trading off the size of the
organization and the volume of "discretionary budget" (Migue-Bellanger
[1974). Note that size has often been considered a plausible objective of
managers even in the context of private firms (Williamson [19643).6 Of
course, such ad hoc approaches need not be inconsistent with the approaches
reviewed in this survey, which assume that money and effort are the primitive
arguments of the managers' utility functions. For example, managers may use
their superior information to claim that productivity is (naturally) low and
obtain a larger work force (which enables the employees to slack more or to be
promoted more easily).
Last, we should stress that the differences in behavior between public
and private organizations may be due not to differences in objectives, but
rather to differences in the structure of control. A fundamentalist viewpoint
would take identical objectives for various organizations and show how the
6Some more basic reflections on the theory of the firm are found in
Holmstrom [1982b] and Holmstrom-Tirole [1987].
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legal and administrative environments of the firm induce its employees to
emphasize particular aspects of their objective functions.
3. Static framework: techniques and classification.
3.1 Techniques.
We focus here on a standard model of adverse selection (although we later
introduce moral hazard considerations). The planner acts as a Stackelberg
leader by proposing a contract to the firm. This contract, to which both
parties are fully committed7 once it has been signed, is based on the
variables observable by both sides and generally implies transfers from the
planner to the firm. Both the firm and the planner are modelled as single
maximizing agents. The firm (or the dominant agent(s) controlling the firm)
has some objective function (profit, profit per capita, trade-off between
profit and effort, etc...). It knows more about the production technology
than does the planner. The informational advantage of the firm at the time
the contract is signed allows it to extract a rent. The planner computes the
optimal contract as a Bayesian statistician who has a prior on the uncertain
parameters.
The firm has private information on a one-dimensional characteristic e.
The parameter e belongs to a connected set = [e,]. The (possibly indirect)
utility of the firm, denoted U, depends (a) on a vector (in FL), each
component of which is publicly observable, (b) on the amount of transfer, t,
it receives and (c) on the characteristic . The firm has a reservation
7We will discuss in more detail later the commitment issue in Section 7.
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utility level U, which corresponds to its payoff in an outside option.
Al: U is C 2 and U is strictly positive.
The planner has some prior probability on e, with density v(e) 8 His
objective function is W(e,e)-kt.
From the revelation principle (see, e.g., Dasgupta-Hammond-Maskin [1979],
Myerson [1979]) there is no loss of generality to restricting attention to
truthful direct mechanisms ,t: e e {t(e),t(e)X. For such mechanisms the
announcement of the truth is optimal for each agent:
e E Arg max U(£(e),t(e),8)
The truthful mechanism is said to be individually rational if:
vege, u((e),t(e),e) 
The problem of the derivation of feasible and optimal contracts in this
framework has been the subject of a number of studies. Our present
understanding relies much on the contributions of Mirrlees [1971, 1975],
Spence [1974], Mussa-Rosen [1978], Laffont-Maskin [1980], Maskin-Riley [1984]
and Myerson [1979](to quote only a few). The statements of results which are
presented below are borrowed from the systematic investigation of
Guesnerie-Laffont [1984a]. Besides gains in rigor and generality in the
8In most cases, the model can also be interpreted as relative to a
continuum of different agents with different covering .
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argument,9 Guesnerie and Laffont provide a tool which is precise yet
sufficiently flexible to be used in a systematic way (i.e., to avoid
unnecessary duplications of argument). This aim explains the emphasis put on
the concept of "surrogate" social welfare, introduced in the next pages, which
is systematically used later.
The problem may be decomposed as follows. (1) What are the feasible
contracts or, more precisely, what are the truthful direct mechanisms? (2)
What is the optimal contract? [In this paper, "allocation" refers to the
function ( ), and "mechanism," "contract," "solution" or "outcome" refer to
the pair of functions [C('), t()}.]
The first question is the implementability problem. Implementability is
defined with reference to an allocation te(); (e)is implementable if there
exists a transfer function t(e) such that lte(), t(e)l is a truthful
mechanism.
Guesnerie-Laffont assumes that the firm's and the regulator's utility
functions are C2 and that the distribution [|(e) is continuous. The
implementation question receives the following answer (for piecewise C1
functions ) :10
(T): If a piecewise C1 function is implementable, then, there exists
a transfer function t(') such that:
9Sufficient conditions for implementability are sometimes not analyzed in
the literature.
10A piecewise CO function is continuous except at a finite number of
points of jump discontinuities. A piecewise C1 function is a primitive
of a piecewise C function. See Hadley-Kemp [1971, p. 15-16]. See also
footnote 11.
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dt U dt
de ± iJ U de
and
i ae a [U de 
ve,t,e such that e = (e),t = t(e) and where (.) is differentiable at 8.
The first condition is the first order necessary condition for e = e to
be an extremum of the firm's maximization problem; the second condition is the
second-order condition for e = e to be a local maximum, taking into account
the previous differential equation.
A number of assumptions must be made for the analysis of sufficiency:
A2+: On its domain of definition, the signs of the components of the
- c o ' iUi
vector ae remain the same, say positive (after changing some i in -ei if
necessary. A2 is the same assumption with a negative sign).
A3: 3K > 0 such that (t,t,e) in the domain and for t large enough:
8£Uaeu
I- (t,t,e) ( Kt .
atU
A2+ (with straightforward notation) is a single crossing property of
indifference curves (Spence-Mirrlees conditions). A3 is more technical and
ensures the existence of a solution to the incentive compatibility
differential equation.
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(T2): Assume A1-2 -3, then any piecewise C1 function such that
dt.
i O, is implementable.Vide
(T2) refers to global incentive compatibility. It is only in the one
dedimensional case (L = 1) that  0 is, under the assumptions mentioned, a
necessary and sufficient condition of implementability. In the n-dimensional
de.
case, d- > 0 for all i is sufficient, but not necessary.
Consider now the optimization problem.
(a) In case of costless transfers, i.e. k = O, it is assumed that:
A4: W(e,6) is C2 in (,e), strictly concave in , and such that (eO),
which is defined by 8£W(W(e),e) = 0, is C1 and has a finite number of local
extrema.
Let us specialize to the one-dimensional problem from now on. The one
dimensional planner's problem can be written: 1
1 1The approach in this survey uses standard optimal control theory (see,
e.g., Hadley-Kemp [1971). This theory requires that (a) the state
variables be piecewise C1, and the control variables be piecewise C and
(b) the valuation functional and the state evolution equations be C in
the state and control variables. [Note that here W is C1 in ; we will
look at piecewise-C1 e(.)].
Under Al, A2+, and A3, one can more generally prove that (-) is
implementable (through an appropriate transfer function) if and only if
it is weakly increasing. The one-dimensional planner's problem in which
t(.) is not a priori restricted to be piecewise C1 can be shown under A4
to have a unique solution, and this solution is piecewise C1. Hence, our
approach does not put undue restrictions on (.).
Caillaud [1986] presents a model in which the optimal mechanism is
discontinuous.
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Max i w(e(e),e)v(e)de
f(.) -
s.t. for almost every e
de ( ) 0 (implementability condition)
t(-) is then given by (T1) and any constant of integration such that for
all e,
U(e(8),t(),) 2 U (individual rationality).
(T3) under Al - A4, and with costless transfers there exists a unique
optimal (piecewise C 1) solution t ; it coincides with the symmetric
information allocation on some areas where the latter increases, and is
constant elsewhere, that is, on a finite number of disjoint intervals
(bunching).
Note that we assume that all types of firm operate. However, the planner
may want to induce a "cut-off" point above . This cut-off point, e0, if it
exists, necessarily satisfies W( (0),80) = 0.
(b) When transfers are costly (k 0), we assume separability:
A5: U = V(,e)+t and 82V > 0, aeV > O.
A5 implies A2+ and A3.
As transfers are costly, the individual rationality constraint becomes
binding; but as the firm's indirect utility is increasing in (A5 plus the
envelope theorem), it reduces to:
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v(e(e),e))+t(e) >2 U.
Let us define the "surrogate social welfare function":
w(t,e) = w(t,e) (e) aev(t,e)+kV(t,e)
where (e6) = I kv(x)dx.
e
Transfers no longer explicitly appear in the surrogate social welfare
function. In order to obtain an intuitive interpretation of this function,
let us explain how its derivative with respect to t incorporates the effect of
a small virtual change 65 affecting the agent e, all other things being equal.
The first term Pv()aeWte represents the direct effect on social welfare. The
term -k P(e) aev.et is the product of the social cost of transfers by the
compensating transfer -eVse which has to be made to the firms e concerned.
The last term is 2()8V 6t where 2 V6 t can be interpreted as the uniform(e)8e 8ee
increase in transfer to any agent e' > e which is needed to restore incentive
compatibility, and (e) is the social cost of a uniform unit transfer in the
upper tail of the distribution.
It can indeed be shown after elimination of the term fJt(e)v(e)de in the
e
planner's objectives (using the incentive compatibility condition) that his
problem is equivalent to:
Max W(e() ,e) v(e) de
e
s.t. () 0 a.e.
t(O) is then given by (T1) together with the boundary condition that the
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individual rationality constraint is binding in e.
We are thus back to the case k = 0 and similar conclusions are obtained.
Finally, a conclusion with the same flavor is also obtained for
multidimensional mechanisms.
(T4): If the unconstrained maximum of the surrogate social welfare
function is monotonic, it solves the planner's problem on the broader domain
of piecewise C allocation mechanisms.
The technical analysis developed to treat adverse selection models can
also be used in contexts in which the firm learns e after signing the
contract. The only difference is that the constant of integration of the
transfer function is determined by an expected individual rationality
constraint:
eI u(te(),t(e) ,)v(e)de > U.
e
When the firm either faces bankruptcy or limited liability constraints or is
infinitely risk averse, the situation is very similar to adverse selection
models (see Sappington [1983b]).
3.2 A first classification of models.
The articles we are reviewing here can be classified according to two
criteria.
The first is the criterion of cost observability which leads us to
consider two cases:
First, the planner monitors the firm's output, but cannot observe any
accounting data. Alternatively, the data are too garbled to allow any precise
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inference. This situation is more likely if the firm is independent of the
planner or if it is regulated for a particular project and can transfer
expenses to and from other projects. This assumption is made in Baron-Myerson
[1982], Sappington [1982], Guesnerie-Laffont [1984a and b]. In this case, the
firm extracts a monetary rent from its superior information.
Second, the planner observes the firm's cost or profit. The observation
of accounting variables allows the planner to offer cost reimbursement or
profit sharing rules. Because the firm need not be the residual claimant for
its cost or profit, X-inefficiency (Leibenstein [1966]) becomes an issue: the
firm's choice of an unobservable action called effort need not be socially
optimal (whereas it would be optimal conditional on output in the first case).
The firm then extracts a rent from its private information on e and from its
freedom to choose the level of effort in the form of monetary rent and a slack
rent.
The second criterion that we introduce concerns the firm's responsiveness
to the planner's objectives. To this purpose, let us define two situations of
reference. In the full information case, the information structure of the
original model is modified so that both parties have complete information on e
at the beginning of the relationship (at the contracting date). The optimal
full information outcome is the full information allocation and the full
information transfer. The symmetric information refers to a situation in
which only the planner's information is modified so that he has the same
information on e as the firm at any point in time. The symmetric information
contract consists of the symmetric information allocation and the symmetric
information transfer.
The firm is responsive if the symmetric information allocation is
implementable. The optimal assymetric information allocation may, however, be
different from the symmetric information allocation when transfers are costly
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to the planner.
Note that in adverse selection models, where the firm has complete
information on e at the contracting date, the full information and symmetric
information situations coincide. In models where the firm learns after the
contracting date, and in which both parties are risk-neutral, the full
information and symmetric information allocations coincide, although the
transfers do not, as they reflect respectively ex post and ex ante individual
rationality constraints. Responsiveness is thus equivalent to the
implementability of the full information allocation in these two classes of
models.
According to this criterion, the profit maximizing firm of Baron-Myerson
is responsive, whereas the labor-managed firm of Guesnerie-Laffont is not (see
below).
In the one-dimensional framework, the A2+(A2-) condition describes the
set of implementable C 1 piecewise allocations as being the set of weakly
increasing (decreasing) allocations. Therefore, if A2+ holds (A2-), the firm
is responsive if and only if the symmetric allocation is weakly increasing
(decreasing).
Note that when transfers are socially neutral, (i.e., k = k' = 0), there
may exist a Groves scheme, i.e., a transfer function t(e) that makes the firm
internalize the social value of its choices (see below for an example). In
this case the symmetric information allocation is thus implementable and the
firm is responsive. This may also (but is unlikely to) happen if transfers
are socially costly and if there exists a transfer function t(e) that turns
the firm's preferences on given t(e), into the planner's preferences on 
given the symmetric information transfer function.
The above criteria are not to be taken too strictly; they mainly have the
purpose of allowing a convenient classification. Sections 4 and 6 consider
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the case of responsive firms and emphasize respectively monetary and slack
rents. Section 5 considers the case of monetary rent without responsive
firms.
4. Informational monetary rent with responsive firms.
4.1 Variations on the basic model.
The models in this section have the basic structure described in
Baron-Myerson [1982] and Sappington [1982]'s pioneering articles. Some
characteristics of the cost function of the firm are unobservable to the
planner; the cost function can be written C(e,q) where e is the (vector of)
unknown parameter(s) and q the output level. (So: L = 1 and = q). The
firm behaves according to the standard profit maximization criterion and has
some reservation value for profit.
This principal-agent problem has a rather straightforward solution in the
case where there is no cost of transferring money to the firm (k = k' = 0).
In this case, the (ex-post) social welfare can be written W(q,) = S(q)-C(q,e)
where S(q) is the social surplus. The symmmetric information allocation can
be reached under asymmetric information by giving the firm a monetary reward
S(q) when it produces q. Then the firm's maximization problem coincides with
the planner's maximization problem and the scheme is said to implement the
symmetric information allocation q(e). This result, which was noted by
Loeb-Magat [1979] when q is the quantity of a pure public good is nothing else
than the transposition to our problem of the Groves-Clarke-Vickrey mechanism.
In essence, it is extremely general; in particular, it applies whatever the
unknown parameter space is as well as to the case of several outputs. The
nature of the informational rent obtained by the firm is clear: it is equal
to the difference between the net social surplus and the net social surplus
generated by the least productive firm (among those which should remain in
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operation). Hence, it increases with the productivity of the firm.
More difficult questions appear when the social welfare function
incorporates a disutility of the transfer, either because of a redistributive
concern, or because of the presence of a cost of public funds (see subsection
2.1). As previously, the symmetric information allocation is implementable
through a Groves mechanism but the expected value of the associated transfer
is too high. The optimal solution trades off between the financial or
distributional losses associated with the expected transfer and the efficiency
losses generated by the departure from the symmetric information (efficient)
output. The monetary rent obtained by the firm decreases when compared to the
monetary rent obtained under the Groves mechanism.
The linear quadratic case.
Let us describe the solution under the following simplifying assumptions.
The good is a non-marketed good and the uncertain parameter is
one-dimensional. The model is called "linear quadratic" in the sense that the
1
cost function is linear C(e,q) = q where e is the unknown productivity and
/32
the surplus function is quadratic S(q) = q - q so that the marginal
willingness to pay for the non-marketed good (the equivalent of the demand
function for a private good) is linear: P(q) = -3q.
With a cost of public funds, the ex-post social welfare is
2
W = q - 3 - k't. With a uniform distribution of over a segmente e
20
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[e,0] of length 1,1 the surrogate social welfare of subsection 3.1 takes the
form:
=aq- q -e2
eThe term - represents the effect of a unit change of q for a 0 agent on
the total transfers needed to restore incentive compatibility for agents
0' 2 0 (c.f. section 3.1, page 15). It follows from (T2) of subsection 3.1
that the optimal (incomplete information) output q () satisfies:
* 1 Ok'
a- Rq (0) = ( +-- .
Note that for e = e the right hand side becomes 1(l+k'). "At the top,"
the social marginal willingness to pay equals the social marginal cost (here,
the true marginal cost multiplied by a coefficient that reflects the fact that
the social cost associated with an expenditure of $1 by the firm, backed by
the planner, is $(l+k')).
We can now look at a number of variants of the linear-quadratic model,
with uniform distribution, by combining the options private-public good, cost
of public funds-distributional concern: the main points of the analysis in
1 2The analysis is similar as long as the distribution satisfies the
Ifv (x)dx
"monotone hazard rate property," i.e., v(0) is non increasing (this
condition is also satisfied for instance by the exponential
distributions).
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each case are gathered in the following table. Within each of the main four
boxes, line 1 gives the market price of the commodity when the planner
implements the full information second best optimum (denoted by ()). Lines 2
and 3 refer to the imperfect information second best optimum: line 2 exhibits
the surrogate welfare function while line 3 gives the expression of the price
of the commodity. Note that the upper right-hand side box gathers the results
obtained above, the lower left-hand side corresponds to the linear quadratic
version of Baron-Myerson's model.
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Distributional
Objectives Cost of Public Funds
(1 - k) (k')
1.- p(e) = 1. P(e) = (1+k
k& 2. S(e) = (l+k')
Non-marketed good 2. S(q) - k 2. S(q) - -
1. p(&) = -1P(9) e [1+2k,] [1+k' (c+1)J
Marketed Good 2. S(q) i kj 2 q 2. S(q) - - - k' -2 qP(q)
(U=- qP(q)+t)e 3. p*(&) =- k e . () [-' (q l
3.ap*(e)e- (G+k(o -2  *(- S'')L-+2k' [ - 9 .JJ
A number of observations can be made from this table:
(a) In all cases, k = 0 or k' = 0 imply p*(e) = p(e). The (first-best)
symmetric information policy is obtained because the firm is responsive and
transfers are costless. As mentioned earlier, in all cases, the scheme that
implements the symmetric information policy is a Groves scheme. Although the
firm always retains the entire social surplus, the transfer takes a different
form for public goods (t(q) = S(q) as seen above) and private goods (t(q) =
S(q)-P(q)q).
(b) Where there are distributional objectives, the public good case and
the private good case have the same solution (lines 2 and 3 are identical).
This is not surprising since in that case, only the total transfer from
consumers to the firm matters (and not the part going through public
channels).
(c) The different forms taken by the surrogate social welfare function
come from the differences in the planner's objectives and not from the
incentive compatibility constraint. For example, the interpretation of
e2'
sketched above for the public good-cost of public funds case, also holds for
the other cases.
(d) Line 3 shows that in all cases the regulated price is superior to
the full information marginal social cost, the equality being only restored
for e = (this is similar to the well-known result of "no distortion at the
top" of the income tax literature; see Seade [1977]). Also for a fixed , the
discrepancy increases with k and k'. This fits with the discussion on the
planner's trade-off between equity and efficiency: when k(k') increases, the
planner is less eager to correct efficiency biases.
Remark: Guesnerie and Laffont [1984b] consider a firm's objective function
which depends on its profit and its size. Using the techniques developed
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above, they show that the concern for size mitigates the monopolist's tendency
to restrict output. While the firm's employees often prefer a larger size, it
would be desirable to obtain the reduced form objective function from more
fundamental organizational considerations.
In all cases, the optimal solution trades off efficiency (which is
obtained with Groves schemes) and costly transfers. The nature of the
trade-off is clearly visualized from the comparison of the non linear payment
schemes associated with the optimal incentive schemes, and corresponding to
different values of the cost of transfers. Figure 1 sketches the optimal non
linear payment scheme for a firm producing a public good for different values
of the coefficient of cost of public goods.
Assume that it is always desirable to have all in operation and that
the least productive firm has the cost function associated with the line
(1). The non linear Groves scheme (t(q) = S(q)) is depicted by (2). It is
optimal for k = O, as well as its translation (3) which satisfies firm 's
individual rationality constraint. When k increases, the optimal production
for the firm becomes smaller and the rest of the payment scheme becomes
flatter (4), (5). Both the expected surplus and the expected value of
transfers decrease.
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(2)
(1)
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(4)
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q
Figure 1
Fixed cost.
Until now, we have assumed that the firm's cost was proportional to
output, i.e., there was no fixed cost.
When the fixed cost is publicly known, the same transfer scheme as before
is optimal (of course, the determination of the cut-off point takes into
account the fact that the fixed cost must be paid to the firm).
Assume now that the fixed cost is unknown (the case considered in
Baron-Myerson). We shall first suppose that the proportional cost is known
(equal to one, say), 1/e becoming the fixed cost. The optimal solution has
straightforward features. The planner should reimburse a fixed amount of
1fixed cost e , and then enforce a price equal to the marginal social cost
0
(see the above table). Firms with a fixed cost above do not produce
1 1whereas the others enjoy a monetary rent e e The main problem of the
principal in this case is to determine the cut-off point eO . It increases
with k, k'.
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To combine an unknown fixed cost with an unknown proportional cost as
done by Baron-Myerson, some consistency assumptions must be made. In fact,
when the privately known parameter is a productivity parameter, one might
suppose that both marginal and fixed costs are positively correlated and, for
example, decrease when the productivity parameter increases. Then the
analysis proceeds as above. The optimal pricing policy depends only upon
marginal cost, and determines the transfer up to a constant. Taking into
account the fixed cost, one then determines the constant in the transfer
function and the (unique) cut-off point simultaneously.
However, if decreases marginal cost and increases fixed cost, the
correlation becomes negative. Depending on the relative effects of upon
marginal and fixed costs, the variations of the firm's utility and of the
planner's objective function with respect to e may not be monotonic; there may
then exist several cut-off points that determine domains where the firm's
activity is socially beneficial and domains where it is not.
A further extension of the model is the case where both variable and
fixed costs are unknown to the planner, and are partially or even non
correlated in the planner's prior. Rochet [1984] focuses on this problem in
the Baron-Myerson setting. The planner wants to regulate a monopoly whose
cost function depends on a two-dimensional unknown parameter (,e 2): the
first determines the proportional cost, while the second determines the fixed
cost.
As in the original Baron-Myerson paper the regulating policy is
restricted to one of the following form:
r(61,62): the probability that the firm will be allowed to produce.
q 1(ei)e :the regulated quantity.
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t(e1,e2): the monetary transfers to the firm.
The most important feature in the paper is that, although the optimal
policy in the one-dimensional case is deterministic, strict randomization in
general is obtained in the two-dimensional case for a set of characteristics
of positive measure. Also, on the subsets where the optimal scheme is such
that r 1, the optimal regulated price can depend on 2, and is not
independent of the demand function (as in the one-dimensional case with
distributional objectives).
On the subsets where the optimal r is equal to 1, if the prior on 81 is
independent of 92 and uniform, the optimal quantity is the Baron-Myerson
regulated quantity. Rochet finally exhibits a partial differential equation
and other relations that together characterize the optimal allocation in the
general case. Dana [1987], Engers [1987), Laffont-Maskin-Rochet [1987], and
Quinzii-Rochet [1985] also give some indications about the way of dealing with
multidimensional incentives.
4.2 Imperfect cost observability.
The observability assumption of the Baron-Myerson analysis amounts to
positing that cost observation is impossible. Baron-Besanko [1984a]
introduces in this framework the possibility of observing cost with an error
and with an observation cost. Precisely, the principal may decide to audit,
in which case he observes a "noisy" estimate of marginal cost C + where
1 
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c is random with zero mean, and the true productivity.1 3 c is a measurement
error (it could also be an ex-post randomness in cost). The firm is still
assumed to be risk-neutral.
Assume first that auditing is costless. If, furthermore, is observed
without error, the full information optimum could be implemented. In fact,
the conclusion remains if there are errors in measurement. Suppose the
planner announces an output policy, a preobservation transfer t(e) = 0 for all
e and reimburses the firm according to the observed total cost. The firm has
a zero expected profit whatever its announcement and, as it is risk-neutral,
it has no strict interest in lying, whatever the announced output policy.
There is no incentive compatibility problem and the full information optimum
can be implemented.
Let us now follow Baron and Besanko by introducing a fixed cost of
auditing. The planner precommits to a probability of auditing as a function
of the announcement e.14 We shall first stress that in the absence of bounds
on possible transfers and penalties it is usually possible to approximate the
full information solution with a probabilistic scheme. The argument is
reminiscent of the classical argument of Mirrlees [1975]. Consider an output
1 3Note here a slight difference with Baron-Besanko's formulation where
total (and not marginal) cost is observed. Only minor differences in the
argument are implied by our different hypothesis.
1 4Commitment on a probabilistic auditing a priori requires something like
a public lottery. As the optimization problem is linear in
probabilities, the optimal policy is bang-bang. Note, however, that our
next reasoning, which shows that in the absence of bounds on transfers
the full information allocation can be approximated, relies on the use of
a probabilistic scheme.
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q(e) and let p(O) be the corresponding market price (in the case of a private
good). Assume that the distribution of , with cumulative distribution F, is
symmetric and single peaked, and consider the following policy:
1. The preobservation transfer is zero.
2. If C1, the observed unit cost, satisfies IC1 I > a > 0, the firm
1 e
pays a penalty N and is reimbursed Clq(e); if IC1 - -j 5 a, the firm receives
e
a bonus B in excess of the reimbursement C q(e). B and N are related by AB =
def 1
(1-A)N where A = F(a)-F(-a), and the planner audits with probability .
Because of the properties of the distribution function and of the incentive
scheme the mechanism is approximately incentive compatible (the announcement 
becomes close to ) for N large.1 5 In particular, the full information optimal
allocation q is approximately implemented by this scheme, which furthermore
minimizes the expected transfer cost.
Following Baron and Besanko let us introduce bounds in the penalty
system: N is constrained to belong to the interval [0,N]. 16 Basically,
ex-post transfers are constrained downwards. The principal cannot use a
policy in which a smaller probability of auditing goes together with an
increase in penalties. The flavor of the optimal auditing and pricing scheme
1 5There is a small chance of being audited. The expected ex-post penalty
when e e is of the order of iijN, whereas the gain from lying, when
auditing does not occur, is finite.
16On the role of bounds in penalties or risk aversion, the reader will
fruitfully consult the literature on moral hazard: see Polinsky-Shavell
[1979], Nalebuff-Stiglitz [1983], Nalebuff-Scharfstein [1987] and Bolton
[1985].
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derived by Baron-Besanko can be briefly given:
1. As already mentioned in footnote 14, the optimal auditing policy is
bang-bang. In fact, the probability of auditing is one for productivity
announcements smaller than some threshold level and zero for higher
announcements. Only "suspect" O's are audited.
2. The optimal pricing and transfer policies in the non-auditing region
are the same as in Baron-Myerson (up to a constant for the transfer function).
3. In the auditing region, the firm pays the penalty N whenever the
observed productivity is high (to counteract its tendency to announce an
underestimated productivity) and zero otherwise. Note that if ex-post low
cost may be penalized, it only happens for high ex-ante announcements. An
interesting finding is that the cut-off point for the penalty is the maximum
likelihood estimate of total cost given the announcement .
The previous results rely upon the assumption that the individual
rationality constraint only binds for the lowest , which is not necessarily
the case. This surprising fact comes from the penalty and auditing policy:
the usual argument that a high productivity firm can mimic the action taken by
a low productivity firm and still obtain more, does not apply; a high
productivity firm has a high probability of having a low C1 and therefore, of
being penalized if it pretends to have low productivity. One has then to
check if the optimal policy satisfies the individual rationality constraint.
If one is unlucky, the independence of the pricing rule with respect to
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auditing disappears.17
4.3 Input versus output control.
The literature we review assumes that regulation concerns one or two
observable variables and that technological uncertainty is one-dimensional.
Assuming that only one observable variable is the object of regulation, but
that one can choose this variable from among a number of possible candidates
(i.e., observing more than one variable is too costly), we wish to address the
question of the choice of this variable. For instance, in the context of the
control of production, one has to compare control via output (which may be
costly because of the difficulty of measuring the quality dimension) and
control via an input (which may be costly because of the possibility of
secret purchases and resales).
There is not perfect symmetry between input control and output control in
the following sense: if a firm commits to the delivery of some output level,
1 7Baron-Besanko's paper relates also to Green-Laffont [1986); this latter
paper focuses on the formalization of monitoring technology, i.e., on
sophisticated mechanisms that involve a mean of detecting announcements
which are obviously far from the true characteristics. Mechanisms where
the set of possible announcements attainable by a 0-agent depends on e,
are especially studied. In this framework, the Revelation principle
fails. Changing a direct mechanism into a truthful direct one, according
to the standard argument of the Revelation principle, changes the
available set of outcomes for an agent. The Green-Laffont technology of
control has to be clearly distinguished from Baron-Besanko's; the latter
gives a noisy estimator of e which only depends on e; in the former the
information transmitted to the principal depends on the agent's
characteristic and announcement.
Let us note that the Baron-Besanko model has some analogy with the
literature on the use of bonus penalty systems in automobile insurance in
the presence of adverse selection (see, e.g., Dionne [1983],
Henriet-Rochet [1986]).
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it is very unlikely to produce more and destroy the excess. On the contrary
if the firm has a right to the delivery of some input quantity, it may be in
its interest to destroy some or to produce inefficiently.
Assuming for the moment that the full utilization of input(s) can be
ascertained, is it better to control output or to control input? From the
following simple example one can guess that input or output control are not
equivalent. Take a firm producing a public good with unknown productivity e;
its utility function is t - as a function of output and t-x as a function of
the amount of input x; increasing function q(e) are implementable in one case,
whereas any function x(e) is weakly implementable in the other case (in
particular, the symmetric information allocation can be reached by simply
reimbursing the cost of the input up to a constant).
To go further, let us use the Guesnerie-Laffont [1984a] formalism. The
firm's utility is denoted U(q,t,e). If output q is related to input x through
the relationship q = f(x,e), the utility function as a function of (x,t,e) is
U(x,t,e) = U(f(x,e),t,e). The "constant sign" condition A2+ associated with
this new function is:
=- ] f + =_ a 0.
ae U 1 e at ua ef ° 0
It is not implied by and does not imply the "constant sign" condition
'a U
associated with the first utility function i.e., ae[ a > 0. This suggests
that input and output control will generally not be equivalent (for the
discussion of a similar problem in another context, see Maskin-Riley [1985)).
When the full utilization of input(s) cannot be ascertained, a moral
hazard problem arises. Let us consider a firm using two complementary
factors, labor L and capital K, to produce an output q = Min K,L}, as in
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Crampes [1983]. If this production function is common knowledge, output
control is sufficient since it is in the interest of the firm to produce
efficiently (K = L = q). However, if the planner can control only one of the
inputs, say capital K, and if he proposes an allocation K superior to the
"pseudo-monopolistic" production of the firm qPM (such a production maximizes
monopoly profit gross of the capital expenditure and is clearly above the
usual monopolistic production) then the firm will choose to use only L = q
and destroy the excess capital. Hence, if this pseudo-monopolistic production
is smaller than the first-best one, the planner cannot implement the
first-best allocation and his best strategy consists of proposing K = qPM to
the firm.
Now assume that the planner cannot prevent input destruction, and cannot
observe the firm's productivity of capital: q = Min {.,L . In controlling K
the planner faces both moral hazard and adverse selection problems. If
efficiency could be imposed, the optimal mechanism could be derived according
to standard techniques. It would be some increasing function K*(e), the
precise characteristics of which depend upon the planner's objectives. The
optimal production would be q*(e) = K(e) Under moral hazard, the optimal
production is equal to min q*(e),qPM(e)}. The introduction of some
substitutability between the inputs would lead to less clear-cut conclusions:
excessive substitution of labor by capital would replace pure destruction but
the nature of the problem would not be much different.
4.4 Multidimensional output.
In Baron and Myerson only one output is produced. The multi-output case
has been studied by Sappington [1983a]. The cost function is separable in
each output and technological uncertainty is one dimensional.
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In this framework the standard results are generalized. This is not
surprising in view of the results of adverse selection problems with several
observables reported in Section 3. The optimal trade-off induces a distortion
in the technological choice and in the pricing policy. Ramsey prices need not
be optimal and cost minimization may not be desirable.
5. Non responsiveness.
The model we use here is a simplified version of the model of the
labor-managed firm in Guesnerie-Laffont [1984a]. The firm's output is ef(t)
where is the number of workers; f describes a decreasing returns to scale
technology and e is a productivity parameter known only to the firm. The
observable variable is not the output, as in Baron-Myerson but the number of
(homogeneous) workers.1 8 However, the significant difference between this
model and those of the preceding section concerns the objective function of
the firm. Here it is assumed that the core of employees (the workers or the
managers) has superior information about the productivity of the firm. It
must decide the size of the staff, under the constraint that all employees
must be treated equally. As is usual in the theories of the labor-managed
firm, this begs the question of the hiring (firing) process. Let us posit
that the firm's behavior is described by the maximization of income per
ef(e)-K+t
employee, i.e., that its objective function is , where the price of
the output is one and K is a fixed cost.
1 Because output is sometimes easy to observe, one may want to think of e
as being the output price -- which may not be observable because of price
discounts. See also below for another interpretation.
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Under symmetric information, the socially optimal employment grows with
productivity 9. Can this symmetric information employment policy be
implemented, and thus be the asymmetric information optimal policy for a
planner without concern for transfers? It turns out that the utility function
of the firm satisfies the single crossing condition but that indifference
curves rotate with e in the wrong sense. In other words, it satisfies the
wrong single crossing condition so that the symmetric information employment
cannot be implemented. In the terminology suggested above the firm is non
responsive. This phenomenon deserves further explanations. We know that a
labor-managed firm restricts production; it produces less than its competitive
counterpart. It is also known that the firm displays the Ward pathology; when
the price of its output (or its marginal productivity) increases, employment
decreases.1 9 It can be precisely shown that what we have called non
responsiveness is closely related to Ward's pathology (see Guesnerie-Laffont
[1984a]). The crucial point is not, however, that the labor-managed firm
restricts production (so does the profit-maximizing monopolist) but that the
marginal willingness to increase production (measured, for example, by the
increase in production which is accepted in counterpart of one more dollar of
transfer) decreases with productivity (the contrary happens with a private
monopoly).
Let us now give a sketch of proof of non-responsiveness (i.e., of the
fact that incentive compatibility requires employment not to increase with
productivity) in the case where e, the productivity parameter, can only take
19On this subject, see the classical references Ward [1958], Meade [1944],
Vaneck [1970], and the recent survey of Bonin and Puttermans [1987].
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two values. A contract is then a set f{,t} and J,t}. With straightforward
notations the incentive compatibility constraints can be written:
&f(.C)-K~ t &f(e)-K+t f () -K+t f ()K+t -K+t
>,r~~~~~~ _ ~-- ->
The reader will easily check that the two incentive compatibility
constraints imply:
(e-e) (
or using the fact that there are decreasing returns: (&-e)(4-t) O.
Whether transfers are costly or not, the optimal contract consists of a
fixed size to the firm (independent of its productivity) and a fixed transfer
allowing the less productive firm (or, more generally, the cut-off firm) to
meet its individual rationality constraint. The optimal policy fixes the
number of workers, i.e., does not try to extract information. 2 0
The fact that the observed variable is labor rather than output is not a
significant difference from the Baron-Myerson's analysis, while the assumption
of the maximization of profit per capita is. Were the firm to maximize profit
f{f(£)-K+t-w£} (where w is the workers' reservation wage), assumption A5 would
be satisfied, and from theorem , the implementable allocations C(e) would be
non-decreasing. The firm would be responsive.
2 0 In the terminology of the incentives literature, the optimal mechanism
"bunches" all types of firm. In contrast, the optimal Baron-Myerson
mechanism at least partly separates the possible types (fully separates
them if the hazard rate of the distribution over e is weakly decreasing).
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In conclusion, this work leads to views on the control problems that are
somewhat opposite to the ones drawn from Baron-Myerson. In Baron-Myerson type
problems, some policies can implement the symmetric information optimum; as
these policies are too costly in terms of transfers, the principal has to
trade off in the design of optimal policies. The optimal policy, however,
provides rewards that gradually adjust to performances (although in a
non-linear way). In Guesnerie-Laffont, the optimal policy takes the extreme
form of a pure quota.
6. Monetary and slack rents.
Let us suppose with Laffont-Tirole [1986] that the firm can manipulate
its cost. Assume at the outset that cost is entirely determined by the
unknown technology parameter and the level of an observable variable called
effort and is perfectly observable. Later we introduce forecast or
observation errors.
We make two brief remarks here. First, in all previous models but
Baron-Besanko's, the introduction of the effort variable would not affect
qualitative conclusions: Because cost is not observable in these models, the
firm fully bears its cost and chooses the socially optimal effort conditional
on output. The endogenous choice of effort really becomes an issue when cost
is observed, and therefore is not necessarily borne by the firm. Second, the
nature of effort is not much discussed here. Such a discussion would bring us
back to the question of the interactions which take place within the firm and
hence to the problems of the nature of the firm and of the relevance of its
description as a utility-maximizing agent. One can think of effort as the
effort of managers (workers), the objective function including a disutility of
effort in addition to a linear utility of transfers.
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1
The firm's private information is its cost parameter - . Effort
decreases marginal cost so that the cost function can be written C = [ee q.
The disutility of effort is (P(e) and the good to be produced is a public good.
The planner maximizes a social welfare function that places the same weight on
consumers' surplus as on the firm's welfare and takes into account the cost of
public funds. Since cost but not effort can be observed, in order to
discourage shirking not all costs are reimbursed.
Although the problem includes an unobservable effort associated with the
concept of moral hazard, it is an adverse selection problem in the sense of
Section 1. The variables c (marginal cost) and q (production) are observed
without error: so, L = 2. The utility function of the firm can actually be
written as a function of q, c, the parameter and t the transfer. Similarly,
(after elimination of e) the social welfare can be viewed as depending on
q,c,t and e. This gives rise to a two-dimensional version of the problem
considered in Section 3. For example, under the previous assumptions, the
2
disutility of effort being equal to 2 and c = ee the agent's utility can be
written U = t-qc-½ [ 2 (the agent is income risk-neutral); with the quadratic
2
social surplus function q - q and a uniform distribution for e the
surrogate social welfare function W associated with the problem is:
W = aq q 2- (l+k') c + ( 2] - 3c 2 '
For the optimal policy the partial derivatives of W with respect to c and
q are equal to zero.
More generally, the incentive compatible mechanisms (including the
optimal one) are associated with three functions q(O), C(e), t(e), which
define a curve in the three-dimensional space over which the firm maximizes
its utility.(We use C(e) = c(O)q(G) from now on because we will shortly assume
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that total cost is observed with an additive error; we can then give an
economic interpretation in terms of cost reimbursement rules). The planner
can propose a "knife-edged" mechanism, defined by (q,C,t) 136 s.t. q(e) = q,
C(e) = C and t(e) tl.
The implementability of this knife-edged mechanism requires a perfect
observation of the variables q and C. Unfortunately, the mechanism is not
robust to the introduction of forecast and accounting errors and therefore
does not seem very realistic. Laffont and Tirole emphasize the implementation
of the optimal allocation through linear schemes of the form {q(w),t = a(9)C +
b()] where C denotes the observed cost. If C is the sum of C (previously
defined) and a random, zero-mean variable , the expected transfer for the
firm when it chooses an effort yielding expected cost C is Et = a(e)C + b(e).
Thus, the action q(e),C(e)I associated with the knife-edged mechanism is
still available to the agent and gives him an expected transfer t(e), if b(e)
is chosen such that b(e) = t(&)-a(&)C(e). In order for this action to be
optimal for the agent, the slope of the reward scheme a(e) must be equal to
the partial derivative of the agent's utility function with respect to C,
evaluated at q(e),C(e)l. In other words, the lines t = a(e)C + b(e), which
generate a "ruled" surface in the space {q,C,tI, must be tangent to the
section of agent e's indifference surface at q(&),C(e),t(e)). However, this
condition is not sufficient. The ruled surface must also never intersect the
family of indifference surfaces through q(e),C(e),t(e)j. If this latter
condition is also satisfied, the family of linear schemes implements the
knife-edged mechanism whatever the distribution of the random noise . A more
systematic analysis and general results on the implementability of the adverse
selection allocation under noisy observation can be found in
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Caillaud-Guesnerie-Rey [1986].21
Let us now return to the Laffont-Tirole solution.
The firm, which has private information when signing the contract,
selects among several "incentive contracts," where an incentive contract
shares cost in a linear way. The linear transfer function is the sum of b(e),
which depends upon the announcement of the cost parameter and can be paid
before production occurs and a penalty a(&)C, where a(e) is negative and
increases in absolute value with productivity. High productivity firms are
thus more encouraged to exert effort. There is greater effort distortion than
in the cost unobservability case, but this is more than offset by the
reduction in price distortion.
Two points should be made in conclusion. First, there is a striking
difference between the Laffont-Tirole and Baron-Besanko conclusions since in
the latter case, but not in the former, low costs are penalized (note,
however, that only high announced costs are audited). This difference is due
to the presence of unobservable effort. Second, the Laffont-Tirole model
exhibits another example of firm responsiveness.
7. The Dynamics of regulation.
Until now we have assumed that all information is known (possibly
privately) when the parties sign the contract and that the contract is
binding. These two assumptions are now relaxed successively.
2 1See also Melumad-Reichelstein [1985], McAfee-McMillan [1986, 1987],
Picard [1985], Picard-Rey [1987] and Rogerson [1987].
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7.1 Dynamics under full commitment.
If the relationship lasts long enough, which is the case for most
regulated firms, private and public information may vary over time. On the
one hand, the firm's true parameters can change over time either through
exogenous shocks or through a non-observable action. On the other hand, a
party can obtain more precise information about some unknown parameter from
the other party's behavior.
In this subsection we follow Baron-Besanko [1984b] in considering a
two-period Baron-Myerson model. At the contracting date (the beginning of the
first period), the firm privately knows its first-period efficiency parameter,
and the planner can commit to a two-period contract. The firm learns its
second period efficiency parameter at the beginning of the second period. The
contract involves revelation at each period, and specifies for each period a
transfer and an output that depend on past and present announcements. The
individual rationality constraint must be satisfied at the contracting date
and, unless the firm can also commit, at the beginning of the second period so
that the firm does not quit after the first period.
As a point of reference, we start with a case of dynamic framework with
no dynamics: full commitment and perfect correlation of the information over
time. It is common knowledge that the marginal cost is the same in both
periods - 1 - = We can then restrict attention to truthful mechanismsel e 2 6 '
~1 2
based on a single (first period) announcement of the characteristic.
Proposing two different outcomes for two different periods is equivalent to
proposing, in the static framework, the first outcome with probability 1/(1+6)
and the second one with probability 6/(1+6), where is the discount factor:
as the optimal static contract is non stochastic, the optimal mechanism
elicits the information only once and gives the Baron-Myerson allocation
twice, i.e., the static scheme dominates every revision scheme. The intuition
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is that subdividing periods in a length of time over which the environment is
stationary cannot improve welfare.
Let us now analyze the case of full commitment and no correlation over
1time. For example, the firm's marginal costs in the two periods, 1 and 
e 1 2
are independently drawn from the same distribution. The optimal allocation is
easy to describe, as the two parties in effect sign two different contracts.
The first period allocation is the optimal static one. The contract for the
second period is signed under symmetric information, and therefore gives the
symmetric information allocation. The firm is induced to equalize its
second-period marginal cost and the marginal social value of its product, and
is put at its individual rationality level through a lump-sum transfer.
Although it is a "convex combination" of the previous two cases, the case
of full commitment and imperfect correlation is somewhat more interesting.
Now the second-period transfer and pricing policies affect the first period
individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, as the firm
already has some information about 2 at date one. Baron and Besanko obtain
the following result: in the first period the pricing policy is the
Baron-Myerson static one. In the second period the pricing policy is
intermediate between the symmetric information and the Baron-Myerson pricing
policies.
We first give an intuition about the second period pricing policy.
Suppose the second-period allocation is the full information allocation, and
consider a small increase in the price above the full information price (a
small decrease in the quantity): this introduces only a second-order
distortion in the second-period welfare. However, it implies a first order
reduction in the pace at which the second period profit decreases with the
second period marginal cost - (this pace is proportional to the produced
e2
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quantity by the envelope theorem). As 81 and 82 are positively correlated, a
general decrease in the output under the socially optimal (full information)
output implies a decrease in the absolute value of the negative slope of the
1expected second period profit as a function of . So, given that the
overall expected profit is exogenously fixed for the lowest level of 1
(highest level of 1) (individual rationality constraint), pricing slightlyel
above the full information price in the second-period saves to the first order
on the first-period transfer.
Lastly, we explain why Baron and Besanko obtain the static pricing policy
in the first period. After all, the first-period transfer is used to correct
the static and dynamic incentives to lie (as optimally the second-period
pricing does depend on the announced first-period marginal cost).22 But the
two problems are separable; in particular, the marginal transfer cost is
constant. So there is no effect of the second-period pricing policy on the
2 2Baron and Besanko find the following pricing policy:
aF2
- (al1 a2) F1(al)
i 1
where = l , 2 , f (F1) is the distribution (cumulative
distribution) of a 1, f2(F2) is the distribution (cumulative
distribution) of a2 given a1 and (1-k) is the weight of the firm's profit
in social welfare.
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first-period one.23
7.2 Commitment versus non commitment.
What is usually called commitment is the opportunity to restrict one's
own set of future possible choices or actions. It involves in fact credible
warranties that some future choices are destroyed.
Commitment even in a static framework is an important feature of
regulation. The planner commits to a contract: he binds himself to use the
revealed information of the firm in the specific way it was agreed upon. This
self-constrained behavior must be credible. Were the firm uncertain about the
planner's action, it would anticipate the strategic use of its announcement
(or production) and things would get more intricate.
A relationship may last a long time, involving many actions from both
sides, and still be like a one-period agreement if no new information accrues
and if both parties are able to commit for the entire duration of the
contract. It is important to note that commitment is (weakly) desirable,
since the planner can commit to the strategy that he would choose in the
absence of commitment. This induces the firm to take the same decisions as in
the non-commitment case.
However, commitment is not always possible. We must admit that we do not
have any good single explanation as to why commitment fails to occur more
frpaiiqntly in th r al world. Several possibilities are suggested.
2 3Pratt-Zeckhauser [1986), Baron-Besanko [1984b], and Tirole [1984) study
problems where an unobservable action (investment) as well as uncertainty
change the efficiency parameter over time. Under commitment and ex-post
bilateral asymmetry of information (the binding contract is signed under
symmetric information), Pratt-Zeckhauser and Tirole generalize the
d'Aspremont-Gerard Varet [1979) results and find that the first-best in
effort level and in decision is implementable. But under no commitment,
underinvestment is the rule. In Baron-Besanko the unobservable action
can be interpreted as investment; under full commitment and in case of
independence of the second period information with respect to the first
period inforamtion, the first-best level of investment is realized.
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First, enforceability of binding contracts may require a third party
(although reputation effects may alleviate the problem). The latter must have
some powerful means to force each party to respect the agreement and he must
acquire the information that both parties know. He must be able to observe
what both parties can observe. And despite his powerful role, he must be
neutral, not collude with one party and not try to fulfill his own objectives
(this difficulty arises also in a static model). This combination of
characteristics may not be achieved easily.24
Second, contingencies may be costly to describe or even be unforeseen.
Contracts are then incomplete and must be renegotiated (renegotiation can take
the extreme form of the exercise of authority as in Grossman-Hart [1986] and
Williamson [1985], see also Hart-Moore [1985]).
Third, the two parties may tear up the current contract and renegotiate a
better contract for both of them (as in Dewatripont [1980] and Hart-Tirole
[1987]). This possibility clearly creates a problem with the full commitment
case analyzed above, where a low productivity firm produces an inefficient
output in the second period even though its type is common knowledge.
Fourth, the parties may simply be unable to commit; this argument is
particularly relevant in a regulatory or planning context, where the current
administration may not be able to bind future ones. Future research should
try to distinguish among the effects of these different bases for
non-commitment. In the following discussion, we simply assume that the
2 4Creating a central authority with discretion about how to enforce
contracts can be costly, even if all these conditions are met: see
Milgrom [1988].
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parties cannot commit.
7.3 Dynamics without commitment.
We follow in this section Freixas-Guesnerie-Tirole [1985] who assume that
the firm's private information is perfectly correlated over time and that the
planner can only commit to one-period contracts. The firm may be of low or
high productivity (C(q) > C(q) in terms of cost of producing a quantity q, and
C' C'), and the planner has a prior v1 that the firm has a low productivity.
The firm produces a public good and the planner faces a cost of public funds.
The planner observes only the firm's output. A static mechanism associates
with any announcement of productivity a pair output-subsidy, i.e., either
(t,q) or (tg).
In the static framework we can characterize the optimal incentive scheme
IS(V1):
(i) The individual rationality constraint of the low productivity firm
(LP firm) is binding.
(ii) The high productivity firm (HP firm) is indifferent between both
announcements. With the optimal scheme IS(v1), the HP firm gets a
rent u(v1) (the LP firm has no rent). Note that we explicitly
describe the dependence of the informational rent on the prior
beliefs.
(iii) The HP firm's social marginal cost equals the social value of the
public good.
(iv) The LP firm's social marginal cost is lower than the social value of
the public good.
In a two-period framework with commitment, we already know that the
optimal dynamic scheme is the repeated static scheme.
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In a two-period framework without commitment, the planner designs a
first-period scheme IS1(l 1); the firm announces a productivity level and the
scheme is implemented; then the planner updates his beliefs (2,(1-v2)) and
designs a second period scheme IS2(v 2). The firm is free to accept or reject
any incentive scheme in any period. In this two-period two-player game, the
concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Selten [1975], Kreps-Wilson [1982])
is appropriate. Let us proceed by backward induction as usual.
As the game ends in period 2, it is clear that the second period optimal
scheme is the static optimal one, given the planner's beliefs in period 2:
IS2(v2) IS(v 2). Therefore in period 1, the LP firm knows its future profits
will be zero. Assume that the incentive schemes are constrained to be linear
in output. The slope of an incentive scheme is called a bonus. In the first
period, the LP firm maximizes its current profit: it claims it is LP. But
the HP firm has to trade-off. If it reveals it is HP in period 1, v 2 will
then be zero and it will earn zero profit in period 2; on the contrary, it may
lie either systematically or randomly. When it actually lies, it earns u(u2)
in period 2, where v2 is positive, but gives up a gain of in the first
period, where A t-C(q)-(t-C(q)). A is a measure of the HP firm's incentive
to separate. The planner's beliefs being updated in a Bayesian way, we can
describe three types of equilibria:
* separating equilibria: if A > u(l), firms reveal their true
productivity in period 1. In that case, the first-period separation gain
exceeds the most optimistic second-period profit from the firm's point of view
(obtained when the planner is certain the firm has a low productivity).
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* pooling equilibria:2 5 if A < b6(v ); an argument similar to the previous
one shows that the HP firm pools with the LP firm so that the planner does not
extract any information in period 1.
* semi-separating equilibria: in the intermediate case where u( 1 ) < A <
6u(1), it can be shown that the HP firm actually plays a mixed strategy and
sometimes reveals its true productivity; thus, vl < 2 < 1.
Three conclusions for the first period can be emphasized.
(i) As in the static scheme LP firms earn a zero profit.
(ii) If the static optimal bonus is separating, it is also the optimal
first-period dynamic one. It is clear that if both the optimal dynamic bonus
in the first period and the static bonus are separating then they should be
equal: the static bonus gives higher first-period social welfare than any
other separating bonus and has equal informational value. However, the next
step -- to show that when the static bonus is separating the dynamic optimal
bonus also is -- does not follow easily. Pooling in the first period (or
semi-separation) is not open in the static problem but might be an interesting
option from the viewpoint of the first-period social welfare. Some more work
is needed to demonstrate that it is not so favorable.
(iii) In the case termed "well-behaved," i.e., A increases with the
bonus, the optimal dynamic (first-period) bonus is always greater than or
equal to (whatever the optimal regime) the static bonus. In that case, when
25Pooling must be distiguished from "bunching." Bunching is perfectly
consistent with truthful revelation, while pooling involves "lying."
More generally, the problem that is considered here belongs to a category
of incentives problems which can be characterized by the fact that the
revelation principle does not hold.
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the bonus increases, the regime switches from pooling to semi-separating and
finally, to separating, i.e., there is no reswitching. Thus, there is a sense
in which the search for information leads the planner to be more generous in
the first period.
With a continuum of types, it can be shown that no separating equilibrium
is feasible, let alone desirable (see Laffont-Tirole [1988], which proves this
property in the general non-linear case).
The study of fully non-linear schemes is somewhat more difficult. Since
high transfers may be required to induce the HP firm to separate, the LP firm
may want to pretend in the first period it is highly productive and quit in
the second period to get its individual rationality level (this feature
differs from the static analysis where, under assumption A2+, the LP firm
prefers to announce it has a low productivity if the transfers are such that
the HP firm is indifferent between the two announcements). This strategy
consists of "taking the money and running."
Laffont-Tirole [1988] examines cost observation and moral hazard in a
dynamic non-commitment version of the model presented in Section 5. Under
commitment, the firm's effort is suboptimal, but without commitment this
result does not necessarily hold. Imagine that, for the optimal policy, the
high productivity firm pools with the low productivity one, i.e., produces at
the same cost. If the latter already expends a suboptimal level of effort,
the former a fortiori expends a very low level of effort. It may then be
worth forcing the low productivity firm to work very hard, so that the pooling
behavior of the high productivity firm does not lead it to shirk too much.
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We should also mention the work of Baron and Besanko [1987 who impose a
"fairness condition" on the planner's second-period incentive scheme.2 6
8. Hierarchies and conclusion.
To conclude, we mention two crucial and more radical departures from the
lines of research we have described.
(a) All along we identified the firm with a (group of) dominant
agent(s). In general, however, there may be conflicts among the different
parties that compose a firm that cannot be resolved because of, say,
asymmetric information between these parties. Opening the "black box" that
characterizes the firm will be crucial to understanding how incentives trickle
down within the organization. Two strands of research make some progress in
this direction. The first, directly inspired by operations research problem,
looks at the optimal organization of information flows when information is
truthfully but imperfectly or costly transmitted (Simon [1976], Nelson-Winter
[1982], Geanakoplos-Milgrom [1985], Sah-Stiglitz [1985], Cremer [1986]). The
second looks at hierarchies from an incentive point of view and describes
organizations as overlapping incentive relationships (Williamson [1967],
Mirrlees [1975], Calvo-Wellisz [1978], Tirole [1986b]).
2 6There exists an abundant literature on dynamics in moral hazard and/or
adverse selection problems, or in mixed problems. This work (Radner
[1981] [1985], Rubinstein-Yaari [1982], Rogerson [1985], Roberts [1982],
Lambert [1983], Henriet-Rochet [1984], Holmstrom-Milgrom [1987],
Fudenberg-Maskin [1986], Fudenberg-Holmstrom-Milgrom [1987], Allen
[1985], Rey-Salanie [1986], Malcomson-Spinnewyn [1985], has made more
precise the way in which repetition alleviates the moral hazard problem.
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(b) While it is desirable to study intra-firm incentives, it is also
crucial for our purposes to study the control mechanism. A fundamentalist
approach ought to presume that the parties within a firm have the same tastes
whatever the structure of outside control. In particular, there is no a
priori reason why employees in a public or regulated firm should differ from
their private sector's counterparts.27
The sociological and economic theory of bureaucracy (von Mises [1946],
Weber [1947], Williamson [1964], Downs [1965, 1967], Niskanen [1971],
Fionina-Noll [1978], Olson [1965] and Tullock [1965]) emphasizes the idea that
public control involves one more layer: the shareholder/firm structure is
replaced by the consumers/government agency/firm one. In other words,
supervisor and principal are no longer identical.2 8
This extra layer introduces some extra inefficiency. The public
supervisors must be given incentives to exert supervisory effort (as in
Williamson, Mirrlees and Calvo-Wellisz), and not to collude with the regulated
firms (as in Tirole. For the theory of regulatory capture, see, e.g., Posner
27To some extent our survey of regulation theory applies as well to the
control of private firms by their shareholders. There is no a priori
reason why public supervisors of a given firm should have less
information than their private counterparts. Note, however, that the
public portfolio of firms is biased toward natural monopolies, which are
harder to monitor because of the lack of information about similar firms
or market pressure.
2 8In the private case, one can of course hardly think of a single
supervisor. See the vast literature on shareholders' free-riding and
takeover bids.
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[1974] and Stigler [1971]).29
The hierarchical approaches may shed some light on the debate about the
efficiency of public firms. While public production in the absence of
informational problems is superior to private production (because it corrects
monopoly biases or externalities for instance), it introduces a problem of
delegation of control. As the empirical debate is far from being settled, we
do not think that economists have yet brought a convincing and definite
analysis of the relative advantages of public and private production.
2 9Public supervisors can offer firms slack, perks, job stability (perhaps
not higher wages, as these can be more easily monitored by the consumers).
Regulated firms can offer government agencies votes, jobs, the absence of
strikes or complaints and so forth..
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